In this project, I use Heyting-Brouwer logic, a type of intuitionist logic developed by Rauszer in 1974, to represent how we think about our own social identities with regard to gender, to re-interpret references to Audre Lorde in support of authentically intersectional models of social groups, and ultimately to demonstrate how dialogue across difference plays a crucial role in movements for change.
Learn more about each chapter below.
Negation often reinforces problematic habits of othering, but rethinking negation can make good on feminist hopes for logic as a transformative space for inclusion. As Plumwood argues in her 1993 paper, not all uses of negation in the context of social identity are inherently problematic, but the widespread implicit use of classical negation has limited our options with respect to representing difference, ultimately reinforcing dualisms that essentialize social differences in problematic ways. In response to these limitations, I take inspiration from Dembroff's recent work on the metaphysics of genderqueer identity to build models of social identity using the Heyting-Brouwer logic developed by Rauszer in 1974. Ultimately, I argue that these models demonstrate both how classical negation reinforces problematic habits of othering and how alternative forms of negation can transform our treatment of social identity altogether. (This chapter was also published in a special issue of The Australasian Journal of Logic. Learn more here »)
In early work on feminist logic, there has been significant reference to the now classic Audre Lorde quote: "The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." In this chapter, I argue that while these references do provide an illuminating glimpse into several prominent viability concerns for feminist logic regarding the origin, purpose, features, and practical application of logical tools; none of these references directly address Lorde’s main concern. To remedy this, I reconstruct Lorde's critique of the limitations of white American academic feminism and connect it to the broader context of Black feminism in the 1970s and to the development of intersectional political concepts more generally. To demonstrate the importance of responding to this critique, I then create an initial model of intersectionality which extends the application of Heyting-Brouwer logic, as developed in Chapter 1. While additional work is needed to assess the full impact of such approaches, ultimately, I contend that Lorde's rebuke of the elitism and racism within the women's movement, the sexism within the Civil Rights Movement, and the heteronormativity within both raises prescient concerns for liberatory projects today, which feminist logicians must address if we are to build effective models for change.
Initial work on social models in Heyting-Brouwer logic (as in the first two chapters) focuses exclusively on how an individual agent is thinking about their own self-identity. However, building models which can meet the needs of an intersectional feminist movement requires understanding how agents interact with one another surrounding differences, particularly as it relates to problems which differentially impact individuals based on their social position. In this chapter, I draw upon Lorde's concept of mutual, non-dominant difference and Dembroff and Saint-Croix's concept of agential identity in order to create models of dialogue across difference. As initial examples show, these models demonstrate the power of broader systemic methods for representing difference, present a meaningful contrast to projects which focus only on dualisms involving negation, and provide a fruitful foundation for further work.
For this project, I broaden the application of Heyting-Brouwer logic from a narrow focus on the social identity of particular individuals to consider social movements more generally. To do so, I leverage Audre Lorde's understanding of difference (as developed in Chapter 3) to provide a basis for connecting our individual social positions, mindsets, and need for survival to collective advocacy. Then, taking inspiration both from Lorde's own practices of advocacy and from more contemporary social movements, I create models of resistance and solidarity in action to demonstrate how quiet resistance allows us to sustain ways of being under conditions of oppression, how activist resistance destabilizes limiting assumptions in the push for greater systemic change, and how cultivating solidarity stabilizes broader, more flexible models to support a more inclusive future. Ultimately, I argue that these models provide a powerful way to visualize common challenges faced by social movements, to articulate what it costs for differently positioned individuals to take action, and to reassess what features we should prioritize when looking for a good feminist logic.
In this paper, I construct models of how doubt functions in relation to an agent's current epistemic status, extending the application of Heyting-Brouwer logic (as developed in Chapter 1) to a broader range of reasoning practices. Using these models, I explain problematic cases of disproportionate doubt, such as when excessive doubt prevents people from believing rape accusations and fuels impostor syndrome; and, conversely, when insufficient doubt inhibits collective inquiry across group boundaries and increases our susceptibility to propaganda and conspiracy theories. Given the detrimental effects of disproportionate doubt, we might initially be tempted to abandon practices of doubt in favor of practices which prioritize certainty. However, as careful consideration of these examples reveals, the epistemic norms which fuel disproportionate doubt are the same norms which result from prioritizing certainty. Accordingly, I argue that we need to cultivate practices of doubt that are appropriately calibrated to the circumstances we are in. Doing so will help us to challenge the practices which fuel disproportionate doubt and, ultimately, allow us to replace them with sustainable and inclusive epistemic practices which will create space for shared inquiry on uneven terrain.
In this paper, I build on Kate Manne’s account of misogyny as a structural phenomenon to model how privilege functions within social hierarchies, with a particular focus on highly privileged women within the context of the contemporary United States. To begin, using an expanded form of Heyting-Brouwer logic, I consider how agents' move between different models of social positions and establish how social norms function to expand or restrict these options based on an agent's social status. These options for movement are a form of privilege and are often leveraged to get an agent to comply with an established social hierarchy. Such bargains present highly privileged individuals with the choice to forgo resistance (and any solidarity with those still resisting) in exchange for a better social position which comes with the dubious promise of certain entitlements, such as permission to feel righteous rather than shameful for one's participation in enforcing social norms. However, these entitlements are far from guaranteed and can provoke violent backlash when undermined, as I demonstrate using examples of entitled shame. Ultimately, I argue that complying with malicious bargains regarding one's social status comes with significant hidden cost, which should deter even the most privileged individuals from accepting them.
In her book, The Promise of Happiness, Sara Ahmed argues that happiness is problematic because it reinforces oppression. Building on this work, I develop the concept of happiness narratives: socially embedded stories that include value judgments about what sorts of things will be good for us. Then, through a series of models in Heyting-Brouwer logic (as developed in Chapter 1), I demonstrate how these happiness narratives distort our options for living meaningful and fulfilling lives, particularly in contexts of oppression. This can happen when a happiness narrative constrains one’s socially acceptable choices, as in the case of Glennon Doyle’s work to counter the rigid narratives surrounding happy families; or when a happiness narrative specifically prohibits access to valuable social goods, as in the case of Tressie McMillan Cottom’s discussion of the harmful impact of beauty narratives on Black women. In light of these cases, I provide some recommendations for how agents can build deviant pathways for the future which will actively destabilize the problematic assumptions needed to sustain these happiness narratives.
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